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Dedicated to my friend Frank Iacobucci, who taught me – in his judgments and
in the academic cooperation between us – what a proper balancing between the
common good and the needs of the individual is.
I The right and the limitation
At the foundation of any discussion of human rights lies a basic differen-
tiation between two separate questions.1 The first question is, What is the
scope of the right? That question examines those entitled to the right and
those obligated by it; the acts permissible and forbidden; and the appli-
cation of the right in place and time. Where two or more rights clash,
the question of the relationship between them arises. The second ques-
tion relates to the limitation upon the scope of the right by non-consti-
tutional norms (regular statutes or common law). That question
examines the realization of the right in ‘regular’ law and the extent of
protection granted it. The answer to the first question is found in the
constitutional language that (explicitly or implicitly) entrenches the
right. The answer to the second question is found in the constitutional
scheme that allows limitation of or infringement upon the right.
Constitutional interpretation is used in answering both questions.2 This
article focuses on the second question.
The possibility of limiting behaviour that falls within the scope of a
constitutional right is entrenched in limitation clauses.3 Limitation
clauses are central to the understanding of constitutional democracy
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1 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: a Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982) at 89, distinguishing between coverage (which determines the
scope of the right) and protection (which determines the extent of its realization).
Blurring of this differentiation would deal a severe blow to the status of rights. Thus,
for example, the proper location of considerations of public interest is not in the
determination of the scope of the right but, rather, in the determination of the
possibility of realizing it.
2 On constitutional interpretation see Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 370 [Barak, Purposive Interpretation].
3 On limitations clauses, see Armand L.C. de Mestral et al., eds., The Limitation of Human
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 1986); Alexandre
Charles Kiss, ‘Permissible Limitations on Rights’ in Louis. Henkin, ed., The International
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and of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes.4 They are an
expression of the democratic values of society. Limitation clauses can
be explicit or implicit, general or particular. In Canada, they are
entrenched in art. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which determines that
[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the Rights
and Freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.5
A similar provision appears in Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Freedom:
There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law
befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose,
and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted
by virtue of express authorisation in such law.6
The similarity between the two provisions is great. It is not coincidental:
the Israeli legislature was familiar with the Canadian limitation clause and
was influenced by it.
Both provisions – the Canadian and the Israeli – have been inter-
preted by the courts as including the principle of proportionality.7 The
content that has been derived from this principle is similar in both
legal systems. The Supreme Court of Israel has been influenced on this
matter by the Supreme Court of Canada. I assume – without knowing
– that the Supreme Court of Canada was influenced by the case law of
the Supreme Court of Germany, or by the European Court of Human
Rights, which, in turn, was influenced by German law. Otherwise, it is dif-
ficult to explain the great similarity between the conditions of proportion-
ality in the three legal systems.8
Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1981) 290.
4 See David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, art. 1.
6 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1454 Sefer Ha-Chukkim (10 March 1994) at 90, online:
Knesset http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm.
7 On proportionality, see Juergen Schwarze, European Administrative Law (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1992) at 677; Mahendra Pal Singh, German Administrative Law in Common
Law Perspective (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2001) at 160; Robert Thomas, Legitimate
Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000)
at 77; Evelyn Ellis, ed., The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 1999).
8 See Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2004) at 334.
370 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
II The conditions of proportionality: Proper objects and proper means
Proportionality examines the relationship between the object and the
means for realizing it. Both the object and the means must be proper.
The relationship between them is an integral part of the proportionality
test. Despite the centrality of the object component, no statute in Israel
has been annulled merely because of the lack of a proper object. A
similar approach exists in German constitutional law.9 In practice, the
main importance of the object has been in examining the means for
realizing it; the main role of the object has been as a mechanism for
examining the constitutionality of the means. That is regrettable. The
object component should be given an independent and central role in
examining constitutionality, without linking it solely with the means for
realizing it. Indeed, not every object is proper from the constitutional
perspective. This is not an expression of a lack of confidence in the
legislature; rather, it is an expression of the status of human rights.
True, an object may advance the general social interest. In certain circum-
stances, however, the advancing of that general interest might not justify
limitation of a human right.
Canadian law has determined that an object is proper if it is necessary for
the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance. Therefore,
the object must be ‘pressing and substantial.’10 Canadian case law does
not differentiate, with respect to the object, between the different rights.
Any limitation – of whatever scope – must, in any case, uphold the perma-
nent, unchanging standard regarding the object. Israeli case law originally
adopted the Canadian approach.11 A general formula was determined that
applies to all limitations upon all rights. According to this formula, an
object is proper if it is intended to realize societal objectives that are in
line with the values of the state in general and are sensitive to the place of
human rights in the general social arrangement. With respect to the need
for realization of the object, it was determined, after some hesitation, and
with influence from American case law, that the need varies according to
the nature of the right.12 I discussed this in one case, stating that,
for the purposes of safeguarding human rights against limitations by law, not
all rights are of equal status. The status of the right to human dignity is not
the same as the status of a property right, and, within the framework of the
9 See Dieter Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional
Jurisprudence’ (2007) U.T.L.J. ??? [Grimm, ‘Proportionality’].
10 See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at
823 [Hogg, Constitutional Law].
11 See Bank Hamizrahi Hameuchad v. Migdal, C.A. 6821/93, PD 49(4) 221 at 435 (1994).
12 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, H.C. 5016/96, PD 51(4) 1 at para. 49 (1997)
[translation mine].
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same right, the extent of protection from limitation may vary. Thus, for
example, the extent of protection from limitation of the freedomof political
expression is not the same as the extent of protection from limitation of the
freedom of commercial expression . . . in the framework of a specific aspect
of a right (such as political speech), a limitation upon the core of the right is
not the same as a limitation upon its outer rim.13
In all the cases that have arisen to date, the examination has been of a
severe limitation of a right whose importance among human rights is
great (e.g., human dignity). Thus, a standard of ‘substantial social
object’ or ‘pressing social need’ has been employed. Standards for limit-
ations of other rights have yet to be determined.
Determining the proper object of a statute is difficult. A statute usually
has a number of objects, at different levels of abstraction.14 How is the
level of abstraction for the purposes of constitutional examination deter-
mined? Is the statute’s object determined according to the (subjective)
intent of the legislators, or does it include an objective aspect?15 These
are all difficult questions that have yet to be examined in depth.
Alongside the need for a proper object lies the need for the proper
means. All three legal systems considered here – German, Canadian,
and Israeli – determine that the means are proportional only if they with-
stand three steps (subtests). Only the simultaneous satisfaction of these
three steps makes the means chosen by the legislature proper. The first
step is that a link of fit or rational connection is needed between the objec-
tive and the means. The means employed by the statute must be derived
from the achievement of the objective that the statute seeks. The second
step is that the means employed by the statute must impair the right as
little as reasonably possible. This is the necessity, or least drastic means,
element. The third subtest requires that there exist a proper proportion
between the means and the objects. This is the proportionate effect
element, also referred to as ‘proportionality stricto sensu.’ In employing
those three steps, reasonable room for legislative manoeuvre (i.e., margin
of appreciation) is recognized by the courts of all three countries.
III First step: Rational connection
Peter Hogg notes that ‘obviously the requirement of rational connection
has very little work to do.’16 This conclusion is correct for Israel as well.
13 Ibid. at para. 59 [translation mine].
14 See Barak, Purposive Interpretation, supra note 2 at 113.
15 In interpreting the provisions of a statute, I subscribe to the objective view of the object.
I recognize shifting objectives. This does not necessarily mean that a similar approach
should apply to the understanding of the object for the purposes of a limitation clause.
16 Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 10 at 833.
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Not even one judgment can be found in which that step constituted the
sole reason for the determination that the statute is disproportionate.
This does not mean that the requirement is unnecessary; it only shows
that the scope of this requirement has yet to be examined in depth.
Indeed, this first step raises difficult and complex problems that have
not yet been sufficiently examined. Thus, for example, this step is
based upon the probability that the means that the statute employed
will realize the object. What is the required level of probability? How is
it determined? Is the same level of probability needed for every right?
How can the existence of the necessary probability be proved?17 How
can the rationality of the link be determined when the social consider-
ations at the foundation of the law are polycentric?18
IV Second step: Least drastic means
This step is of great importance in the case law of the Supreme Court of
Israel. As in Germany19 and Canada,20 so too in Israel the constitution-
ality of a statute that limits human rights is determined, in many
cases, by the demands of this step. However, this step has an internal
limitation that prevents it from granting proper protection to human
rights. This limitation is due to the fact that the least drastic means
must be able to realize the object that the statute is intended to
realize. A means that is the least drastic but that realizes another
object, or realizes the statute’s object less properly, is of no use. It is
required that the least drastic means realize the object of the statute
in the same way that the means chosen in the statute would. Of
course, a marginal difference is not decisive. Thus the difficulty latent
in this step is revealed. Only if it is possible to realize the objects of
the statute by less drastic means does this step grant protection to
human rights. If there are no such means, this step does not have
the power to protect human rights, even if the limitation of them is
severe. This step is thus strongly linked to the object of the statute. As
we have seen, a statute may have many objects on different levels of
abstraction. The more the Court lowers the level of abstraction, the
more difficult it is to find less drastic means for the realization of
the object.
17 Sujit Choudhry, ‘So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1’ (2006) 35 Sup.Ct.L.Rev. (2d) 501.
18 See Lon L. Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353;
Aharon Barak, Judicial Discretion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989) at 183.
19 See Grimm, ‘Proportionality,’ supra note 9 at ???.
20 See Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 10 at 836.
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V Third step: Proportional effect
This third step deals with the correlation between the realization of the
statute’s objectives and its effect on human rights. The requirement, in
the words of Dickson C.J., is that there be
a proportionality between the effects of the measure which are responsible
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has
been identified as of sufficient importance . . . Even if an objective is of
sufficient importance, and the first two elements of the proportionality
test are satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the dele-
terious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not
be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must
be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.’21
This test examines the proper correlation between the benefit stemming
from attainment of the proper object and the extent of its effect upon the
constitutional right. It focuses upon the results of the statute. It examines
the proper ratio between the benefit stemming from attainment of the
object and the deleterious effect upon the human right. Whereas the
rational connection test and the least harmful measure test are essentially
determined against the background of the proper objective, and are
derived from the need to realize it, the test of proportionality (stricto sensu)
examines whether the realization of this proper objective is
commensuratewith the deleterious effect upon the human right. It is a prin-
ciple of balancing.22 It requires placing colliding values and interests side by
side and balancing them according to their weight. In one case I wrote that
[t]his subtest examines the benefit versus the damage. According to it,
the governmental agency’s decision must maintain a reasonable balan-
cing between the needs of the collective and the harm to the individual.
The objective of the test is to examine whether the severity of the harm to
the individual, and the reasons justifying it, are reasonably proportional
to each other. That assessment is made against the backdrop of the
general normative structure of the legal system.23
In another case I added that
21 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 139.
22 See Robert Werner Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002) [Alexy, Constitutional Rights].
23 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, H.C. 2056/04 (2006) 2 Judgments of the Israel Supreme
Court: Fighting Terrorism with the Law 7 at 47 [Beit Sourik], online: Israel Supreme Court
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.htm.
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a balance should be made between the extent of the limitation upon the
right and the extent to which the public interest is advanced. With regard
to the right, we must take into account the nature of the right, and the
scope of the limitation upon it. The more basic the right that is being
limited, and the more severe the limitation, the greater the weight is
that will be required from the considerations justifying that limitation.
With regard to the public interest, we must take into account the import-
ance of the interest, and the degree of benefit arising from it by limiting
the human rights. The more important the public interest, the greater
the justification of a more serious limitation of human rights.24
The third step found its full expression in two judgments of the Supreme
Court of Israel. Both deal with the correlation between human rights and
security considerations. The first is the Beit Sourik case.25 The State of
Israel decided upon the erection of a separation fence. Most of it is
located in the West Bank. Its purpose is to prevent infiltration for pur-
poses of terrorist activity from the West Bank into Israel or into Israeli
settlements in the West Bank. The object of the fence – so ruled the
Supreme Court – is a security object, not a political one: it is intended
to prevent suicide bombings.26 In the Beit Sourik case we determined
that this security object is a proper one. We further ruled that the con-
struction of the separation fence in the area of the village of Beit
Sourik was decided on in order to achieve a proper security objective.
A rational connection was proven between the construction of the
fence in that place and the achievement of the security objective. It was
held that there was no other route that would harm human rights less
but still achieve the proper objective in full. Notwithstanding this, it was
decided that the route of the fence was unlawful. This was because the
security objective achieved by the route of the fence, as determined by
the military commander, was not commensurate with the serious infringe-
ment upon the human rights of the residents of Beit Sourik. We held in
that case that ‘a proportionate correlation between the degree of harm to
the local inhabitants and the security benefit arising from the construc-
tion of the separation fence according to the route determined by the
military commander does not exist.’27 We pointed out that we had been
24 Adalah v. Minister of the Interior, H.C. 7052/03 at s. 74 (2006) [Adalah] [translation
mine].
25 Supra note 22.
26 Regarding the relationship between this case law and the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in ‘Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2004) 43 I.L.M. 1009,
see Mara’abe v. Israel (Prime Minister), H.C. 7957/04 (2006) 2 Judgments of the Israel
Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism with the Law 65.
27 Beit Sourik, supra note 22 at 34 [translation mine].
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shown alternative routes that would also provide security for Israel, albeit
to a lesser degree than the route that the military commander chose,
while impinge upon the human rights of the local inhabitants to a far
lesser degree. In light of this, I wrote,
The real question before us is whether the security benefit obtained by
accepting the position of the military commander . . . is proportionate
to the additional injury resulting from his position . . . Our answer to
this question is that the military commander’s choice of the route for
the separation fence is disproportionate. The difference between the
security benefits according to the military commander’s approach and
the security benefits of the alternate route is very small in comparison
to the large difference between a fence that separates the local inhabi-
tants from their lands and a fence that does not create such a separation
or that creates a separation which is small and can be tolerated.28
Indeed, in Beit Sourik a proper (security) object was the basis for the sep-
aration fence; there was a rational connection between it and the achieve-
ment of the security object; no alternative route was found that realized
the security purpose in full. Nevertheless, the route was disqualified
because its limitation of the rights of the local inhabitants was dispro-
portionate. An alternative route, which allowed security to be achieved
to a lesser degree than that required by the proper object but harmed
the local inhabitants far less, was pointed out to us. We said that this
correlation – which provided slightly less security and much more protec-
tion of human rights – was proportionate.
The second case is Adalah.29 This case examined an amendment to the
Citizenship Law dealing with cases of Israelis married to residents of the
Gaza Strip or the West Bank. Until that amendment, the non-Israeli
spouse’s entrance into Israel was possible, subject to an individual security
background check. Security officials found that twenty-six non-Israelis who
had entered Israel under the framework of family unification with their
Israeli spouses were involved in terrorist activity. Not subject to security
checks on roads because of their lawful presence in Israel, they led terror-
ists with explosive charges into Israeli cities, where the terrorists detonated
themselves and caused many deaths. The amendment provided that for a
period of one year (extendable annually by decision of the Knesset) there
would be no family unifications between Israelis and their spouses from
the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. A petition was submitted to the
Supreme Court claiming that this statute was unconstitutional. In our judg-
ment, we recognized the right to family life in Israel as a constitutional
right derived from the right of human dignity. We also decided that
28 Ibid. at para. 61 [translation mine].
29 Supra note 23.
376 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
safeguarding the security of residents from suicide-bombing terrorists is a
proper objective. With respect to the limitation clause, the Court ruled
(with dissent) that there is a rational connection between the flat ban
and the security objective. The Court further ruled that there are no less
drastic means to realize the security objective. Individual security checks,
which are undoubtedly less drastic means, do not attain the security objec-
tive. Was the third step, dealing with proportional effect, satisfied? In my
judgment, I answered that question in the negative:
The question is whether the flat ban is proportionate stricto sensu. Is the
correlation between the benefit derived from achieving the proper objec-
tive of the law (to reduce as much as possible the risk from the foreign
spouses in Israel) and the damage to the human rights caused by it
(limitation of the human dignity of the Israeli spouse) a proportionate
one? The criterion we must adopt is one of values. We must balance
between conflicting values and interests, against the background of the
values of the Israeli legal system. We should note that the question
before us is not the security of Israeli residents or the protection of the
dignity of the Israeli spouses. The question is not life or quality of life.
The question before us is much more limited. It is this: is the additional
security obtained by the policy change, from the most stringent individual
check of the foreign spouse that is possible under the law to a flat ban of
the spouse’s entry into Israel, proportionate to the additional deleterious
effects upon human dignity of the Israeli spouses caused as a result of this
policy change? My answer is that the additional security that the flat ban
achieves is not proportionate to the additional damage caused to the
family life and equality of the Israeli spouses. Admittedly, the flat ban
does provide additional security; but it is achieved at too great a price.
Admittedly, the chance of increasing security by means of a flat ban is
not ‘slight and theoretical.’ Notwithstanding, in comparison to the
severe violation of human dignity, it is disproportionate.30
Further in the judgment, I added that
[e]xamination of the test of proportionality (stricto sensu) returns us to
first principles that are the foundation of our constitutional democracy
and the human rights that are enjoyed by Israelis. These principles are:
that the end does not justify the means; that security is not above all
else; that the proper objective of increasing security does not justify
serious harm to the lives of many thousands of Israeli citizens. Our
democracy is characterized by the fact that it imposes limits on the
ability to limit human rights; that it is based on the recognition that sur-
rounding the individual there is a wall protecting his rights, which cannot
30 Ibid. at ss. 91–92 [translation mine].
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be breached even by the majority. This is how the court acted in many
different cases. Thus, for example, adopting physical measures
(‘torture’) would without doubt increase security. But we held that our
democracy was not prepared to adopt them, even at the price of a
certain blow to security. We must adopt this path also in the case
before us. The additional security achieved by abandoning the individual
check and changing over to a flat ban involves such a serious violation of
the family life and equality of many thousands of Israeli citizens, that it is
a disproportionate change. Democracy does not act in this way.
Democracy does not impose a flat ban and thereby separate its citizens
from their spouses, nor does it prevent them from having a family life;
democracy does not impose a flat ban and thereby give its citizens the
option of living in it without their spouse or leaving the state in order
to live a proper family life. Democracy does not impose a flat ban and
thereby separate parents from their children. Democracy does not
impose a flat ban and thereby discriminate between its citizens with
regard to the realization of their family life. Indeed, democracy concedes
a certain amount of additional security in order to achieve an incompar-
ably larger addition to family life and equality. This is how democracy acts
in times of peace and calm. This is how democracy acts in times of war
and terrorism. It is precisely in these difficult times that the power of
democracy is revealed.. . . Precisely in the difficult situations in which
Israel finds itself today, Israeli democracy is put to the test.31
On the question of the third step, the opinions in the Supreme Court
were split. Four other justices supported my position; five supported the
opposite position. Justice Cheshin, who authored the main opinion
opposing mine, wrote that ‘the additional security – security of human
life – which the flat ban grants us, in comparison to the individual secur-
ity check which is limited, is worthy.’32 Justice Cheshin put life itself on
one pan of the scales. He wrote that
[w]e are concerned with life. Life and death. It is the right of the residents
of the state to live. To live in security. This right of the individual to life and
security is of great strength. It has the chief place in the kingdom of rights
of the individual, and it is clear that its great weight is capable of decisively
determining the balance between damage and benefit.33
Against this – on the other pan of the scales – he placed the right to
family life. According to Justice Cheshin, the right to life tips the
scales; the right to life prevails. In my judgment, I rejected that approach:
31 Ibid. at s. 93 [translation mine].
32 Ibid. at. 182 [translation mine].
33 Ibid. at s. 120 [translation mine].
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Indeed, I accept that if we weigh life against quality of life – life will
prevail. But is this the proper comparison? Had we posed the question
in this way – life against quality of life – we would certainly have held
that we are permitted, and perhaps even obliged, to torture a terrorist
who constitutes a ‘ticking bomb’ in order to prevent harm to life; that
we are permitted, and perhaps even obliged, to reassign the place of resi-
dence of an innocent family member of a terrorist in order to persuade
him to refrain from terror and to prevent an injury to life; that the secur-
ity fence should be placed where the military commander wished to place
it, since thereby the lives of the citizens of the state are protected, and any
harm to the local population, whatever its scope may be as long as it does
not harm life itself, cannot be compared to the harm to the lives of the
citizens of the state. But this is not how we decided with regard to
torture, with regard to assigned residence, or with regard to the harm
caused by the separation fence to the fabric of the lives of the local
residents. . . . In those cases and in many others we always put human
life at the top of our concerns. We were sensitive to terrorism and its con-
sequences in our decisions. Indeed, human life is dear to us all; and our
sensitivity to terrorist attacks is as strong as in the past. We made the
decisions that we made because we do not weigh life against the quality
of life. In weighing life against quality of life, life always takes precedence
and the result is to refrain from any act that endangers human life.
Society cannot operate in this way, either in times of peace (such as
with regard to road accident victims) or in times of war (such as with
regard to victims of enemy attacks). The proper way of posing the ques-
tion is to pose it on the level of the risks and the likelihood that they will
occur, and their effect on the life of society as a whole. The questions that
should be asked in our case are questions of probability. The question is
what the probability is that human life will be harmed if we continue the
individual check as compared with the likelihood that human life will be
harmed if we change over to a flat ban, and whether this additional like-
lihood is comparable to the certainty of the increase caused thereby to
the limitation of the rights of spouses who are citizens of the state.34
I then added,
Democracy and human rights cannot be maintained without taking risks.
Professor Sajo rightly said that ‘liberty is about higher risk-taking’ (A. Sajo
(ed)., Militant Democracy (2004), at p. 217). Indeed, every democracy is
required to balance the need to preserve and protect the life and
safety of citizens against the need to preserve and protect human
rights. This ‘balance’ simply means that in order to protect human
34 Ibid. at s. 111 [translation mine].
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rights we are required to take risks that may lead to innocent people
being hurt. A society that wishes to protect its democratic values and
that wishes to have a democratic system of government even in times of
terrorism and war cannot prefer the right to life in every case where it
conflicts with the preservation of human rights. A democratic society is
required to carry out the complex work of balancing between the con-
flicting values. This balance, by its very nature, includes elements of
risk and elements of probability. . . . Naturally, we must not take any unrea-
sonable risks. Democracy should not commit suicide in order to protect
the human rights of its citizens. Democracy should protect itself and fight
for its existence and its values. But this protection and this war should be
carried out in a manner that does not deprive us of our democratic
nature.35
VI Evaluation of the third step
The third step, which deals with the proportional effect, is the very heart
of proportionality. The first two steps, rational connection and the least
drastic means, focus on means to realize the objective. To be sure, they
examine the limitation of the right, but if there is a rational connection
between the attainment of the objective and the limitation of the right,
and if there is no other, less drastic means that can attain the objective,
the limitation of the right fulfils the first two steps. The third step,
however, is of a different character. It does not focus on means of attain-
ing the objective; instead, it focuses on the deleterious effects upon
human rights resulting from the attainment of the objective. It recognizes
the fact that not all means with a rational connection to the objective that
are the least drastic ones possible do, in fact, justify the realization of the
objective. The ends do not justify all means. There is a moral limit which
democracy cannot surpass.
Three arguments can be made against this approach regarding the
proportional effect step. First, it can be argued that in those cases in
which the third step is not satisfied, it should be said that the objective
is not proper. The emphasis should be put on the quality of the objective,
not the quality of the means. This is the position of Hogg, who writes,
regarding this third subtest,
It is really a restatement of the first step, the requirement that a limiting
law pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to justify overriding a
Charter right. If a law is sufficiently important to justify overriding a
Charter right (first step), and if the law is rationally connected to the
objective (second step), and if the law impairs the Charter right no
35 Ibid. at 85. See Grimm, ‘Proportionality,’ supra note 9 at ???.
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more than is necessary to accomplish the objective (third step), how
could its effects then be judged to be too severe? A judgment that the
effects of the law were too severe would surely mean that the objective
was not sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right. If the
objective is sufficiently important, and the objective is pursued by the
least drastic means, then it must follow that the effects of the law are
an acceptable price to pay for the benefit of the law. I conclude, there-
fore, that an affirmative answer to the first step – sufficiently important
objective – will always yield an affirmative answer to the fourth step – pro-
portionate effect. If this is so, then the fourth step has no work to do, and
can safely be ignored.36
I cannot accept this approach. In a defensive democracy, or in a militant
democracy,37 the objective chosen by the legislature might be proper.
However, it might not suffice to ensure the constitutionality of the
statue, not because of flaws in it but, rather, because of its severe effect
upon human rights. The constitutional emphasis should not be on the
objective only but also on the proper proportion between the objective
and the means employed to realize it. Only such a comparison leads to
the conclusion of unconstitutionality of the statute without making the
objective improper. The objective is proper; the means are rational,
and are no more drastic than necessary for achieving the objective.
However, they are nevertheless unconstitutional, since the achievement
of the objective via these means leads to a deleterious effect on human
rights that is not to be justified in a defensive or militant democracy.
This is well demonstrated in the two examples mentioned. In both of
them, the legislature wished to secure the lives of those who live in the
state. That is a proper objective. However, the resulting limitation on
human rights is so severe that cannot to be justified in a free and
democratic society.
The second argument is that the values-based understanding of the
third step empties it of any objective standard, turning it into a mech-
anism for judicial subjectivity and judicial activism. I cannot accept
this argument. The third step does include an objective standard,
according to which the greater the limitation of human rights is, the
more important the purpose must be in order to justify it.38 There is
nothing unique about this standard. It is used in every case in which
principles are in conflict. It lies at the foundation of the reasonableness
standard, which is merely a proper balancing between conflicting
36 Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 10 at 843.
37 On militant democracy, see András Sajó, ed., Militant Democracy (Amsterdam: Eleven
International, 2004).
38 Alexy, Constitutional Rights, supra note 21 at 102.
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principles. A judge employing the third step does not act in a void and
is not completely free. Admittedly, however, this test does at times grant
judicial discretion. It does not purport to provide a single solution in
every single case. However, this is not a novel situation; it exists in all
branches of law, and it exists in constitutional law too. It certainly
exists if we accept Hogg’s position that the emphasis is transferred
from the effect on the right to the objective itself. Does that transfer
create more objectiveness and, thus, less activism and judicial discre-
tion? Of course, the tests within the third step need to undergo sophis-
tication. Instead of ad hoc balancing, we should aspire to principled
balancing. Tests of causation and severity regarding the blow to the
public interest should be balanced against tests of the limitation of
the various human rights at issue.
The third argument is that the values-based aspect of the third step
inserts a factor of reasonableness into proportionality. According to
that argument, proportionality loses its uniqueness and becomes a
special case of reasonableness. This argument is partially correct. The
third step is based on a test of values. If we see reasonableness, as I do,
as a balancing standard between conflicting principles, then the third
step does insert an aspect of reasonableness into proportionality. This
is an advantage. It does not replace the other steps; they are of great
importance, and they introduce clarity and order in rights limitation.
But without the third step there is no proper protection for rights.
VII Conclusion
I have touched upon certain aspects of proportionality as a constitutional
standard that protects human rights and makes limitations upon them
possible. The general constitutional structure requires recognition of
the relativity of human rights and of the legislature’s ability to prevent
their realization where limitations upon them are proportional. The con-
stitutional dialectic is as follows: human rights and the limitations on
them derive from the same source. They reflect the same values.39
Human rights can be limited, but there are limits to the limitations.40
The role of the judge in a democracy is to preserve both of these limit-
ations. Judges must ensure the security and existence of the state as
well as the realization of human rights; they must determine and
protect the integrity of the proper balance. All this can be achieved by
the proper use of the third step. This was my view on my role as a
judge. I am sure it was Frank’s view, too.
39 Oakes, supra note 20.
40 See Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006) at 82.
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